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Vitiello: Alternatives to Incarceration: Why Is California Lagging Behind?

ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION: WHY IS
CALIFORNIA LAGGING BEHIND?
Michael Vitiello
I. INTRODUCTION
Until quite recently, America was on an incarceration binge for
almost forty years.1 While the sharp increase in incarceration is
almost certainly one cause of reduced crime rates in recent years,2 a
broad consensus has emerged that we incarcerate too many people to
the point of diminishing returns.3 Further, commentators across a
broad political spectrum recognize that alternatives to incarceration
are necessary, especially in light of the current budget crises in many
states.4 They also agree that states can protect the public with sound
sentencing policies while saving money by resorting to less costly
alternatives to incarceration.5
Critics of excessive incarceration include liberals,6 centrists,7 and
conservatives8 outside the political arena. Proposals for reform vary,
but many of their proposals share broad outlines for reform.9 In light
of this consensus, one might have expected that sentencing reform


Distinguished Professor and Scholar, the University of the Pacific McGeorge School of Law;
University of Pennsylvania, J.D., 1974; Swarthmore College, B.A., 1969. Special thanks to my research
assistants R.J. Cooper and Ashley Connell for their research efforts and to Ashley for organizing their
efforts.
1. PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, STATE OF RECIDIVISM: THE
REVOLVING
DOOR
OF
AMERICA’S
PRISONS
(2011),
available
at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/sentencing_and_corrections/State_
Recidivism_Revolving_Door_America_Prisons%20.pdf.
2. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE 56 (2007).
3. See infra notes 74–119 and accompanying text.
4. See infra Part III.
5. See infra notes 74–119, Part III.
6. Michael Vitiello & Clark Kelso, A Proposal for a Wholesale Reform of California’s Sentencing
Practice and Policy, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 903, 952 (2004).
7. Background/Mission/Approach,
PEW
CENTER
ON
THE
STATES,
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/about_background.aspx (last visited Dec. 19, 2011).
8. What’s Gone Wrong, RIGHT ON CRIME, http://www.rightoncrime.com/the-criminal-justicechallenge/whats-gone-wrong/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2011).
9. See infra notes 77–112 and accompanying text.
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would have been easy to achieve nationwide. That has simply not
been the case.10
Many of us predicted that a weak economy would lead to
sentencing reform.11 In some states, that has begun to take place. In
recent years, both very conservative states, like Mississippi and
Texas, and liberal states, like Washington, have achieved modest and
sensible reforms.12 At least, early reports suggest that public safety
has not been sacrificed.13
California has the largest state prison system in the United States14
and a gaping hole in its budget.15 As California’s economic crisis has
become evident, some politicians have tried to advance modest
reform proposals, including recourse to a sentencing commission16
and compassionate release of older prisoners.17 But California
politicians have largely rejected proposals that have proven
successful elsewhere.18 Federal court intervention, affirmed by a
divided Supreme Court, has kept some pressure on California
politicians to reform a badly designed system.19 Recent legislation
advanced by Governor Brown is a partial and relatively tame

10. See infra Part VI.
11. See Vitiello & Kelso, supra note 6, at 952; Michael Santos, Economic Crisis Opens Possibilities
for Prison Reform, PRISON NEWS BLOG (Mar. 4, 2009), http://prisonnewsblog.com/2009/03/economiccrisis-opens-possibilities-for-prison-reform/.
12. See infra Part III.
13. Id.
14. Sonja Steptoe, California’s Growing Prison Crisis, TIME (June 21, 2007),
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1635592,00.html.
15. Claire Suddath, Spotlight: California’s Budget Crisis, TIME (July 27, 2009),
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1910985-1,00.html. Complicating the problem for
the state is the fact that the prison system consumes about eleven percent of discretionary spending.
Randal C. Archibold, California, in Financial Crisis, Opens Doors, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/us/24calprisons.html. Thus, its difficulty in reducing those costs
has forced the state to reduce funds for education and safety net programs. Id.
16. Marisa Lagos & Wyatt Buchanan, Sen. Mark Leno Pushes for State Sentencing Panel, S.F.
CHRON. (Aug. 6, 2011), http://articles.sfgate.com/2011-08-06/bay-area/29857542_1_sentencing-panelsentencing-commission-state-senator.
17. Promoting Inmate Rehabilitation and Successful Release Planning: Testimony Before the H.
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 110th Cong. 42–56 (Dec. 6, 2007) [hereinafter
Testimony Before the H. Subcomm.] (statement of Jonathan Turley).
18. See infra Part V.
19. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
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response to the problem.20 But the state missed a chance to enact a
more sweeping reform.21
This Article explores five themes. First, it discusses the consensus
that has emerged among those calling for reform.22 Second, it
examines how some states have responded to the call for reform.23
Third, it reviews briefly the Court’s ruling in Brown v. Plata,24
upholding the decision of a three-judge panel, requiring California to
reduce the population of its prisons to comply with the Eighth
Amendment.25 Fourth, it explores California’s efforts to reform its
prison overcrowding, especially in response to the federal court
intervention in its prison health care system.26 Fifth, it examines the
unique situation in California: despite its liberalism, it has remained
remarkably resistant to reform.27 Specifically, this article examines
the role of the prison guards’ union,28 victims’ rights groups,29 myths
surrounding the effect of Three Strikes,30 and term limits and a
legislature consisting largely of safe districts31 in frustrating reform.
Some commentators assumed that the federal court order in the
prison health care cases would give California politicians cover,
allowing them to back sensible reforms.32 Governor Brown’s
realignment plan is a step towards broad reform, but quite tame when
compared to other states and the size of California’s larger problems.

20. See 2011 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 15 (West); infra notes 340–41 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 215–53 and accompanying text.
22. See infra Part II.
23. See infra Part III.
24. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1910.
25. See infra Part IV.
26. See infra Part V.
27. See infra Part VI.
28. See infra notes 278–97 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 289–313 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 314–19 and accompanying text; 1994 Cal. Stat. Ch. 12, sec. 1 (enacting Cal.
Penal Code § 667), and the initiative, Proposition 184. See California Ballot Pamphlet, General Election
(Nov. 8, 1994). As developed at notes 315-18, Three Strikes’ proponents insist that crime rates were
rising until enactment of Three Strikes, at which point, crime rates began their precipitous decline. They
could argue that point only by skewing the data.
31. See infra notes 321–35 and accompanying text.
32. Marie Gottschalk, Prison Overcrowding and Brown v. Plata, NEW REPUBLIC (June 8, 2011),
http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/89575/prison-overcrowding-brown-plata-supreme-court-california.

Published by Reading Room, 2012

3

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 10

1276

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:4

As explored below, California has missed an opportunity for more
meaningful reform.33
II. A NATIONAL CONSENSUS
Sentencing reform does occur in the United States. For example,
between the early 1970s through the mid-1980s, groups on the center,
left, and right all called for sentencing reform.34 While the consensus
began to unravel after reform took hold,35 it led to an almost
universal abandonment of indeterminate sentencing.36 A similar
consensus seems to be emerging today. This section reviews the
consensus that emerged during the 1960s, ‘70s, and ‘80s and then
compares it with current reform efforts.
Students of criminal justice today would have difficulty
recognizing the dominant sentencing scheme in place during the
1950s and 1960s. Based on a rehabilitative model,37 indeterminate
sentencing gave judges wide latitude in imposing sentences38 and left
a great deal of discretion to parole boards to set a release date for
offenders.39 The prevailing model, grounded in faith of psychiatry
and science,40 was so integrated into the legal culture that it
influenced the Supreme Court’s case law in cases like Robinson v.
California41 and Powell v. Texas.42 For example, in Robinson, the
33. See infra notes 213–51 and accompanying text.
34. Michael Vitiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1011, 1014–15 (1991).
35. Id. at 1029–31.
36. Indeterminate sentencing was abandoned at the national level by the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1988 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3586, 3621–
3625, 3742 (2006) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–998 (2006)). Since the late 1970s, state after state has
abandoned indeterminate sentencing in favor of determinate sentencing. Alternative Incarceration
Program:
Oregon’s
“Alternative
Incarceration
Program,”
http://www.crimevictimsunited.org/issues/corrections/aip.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2011).
37. AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 10 (1971); MARVIN FRANKEL, CRIMINAL
SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 89–90 (1973); RICHARD SINGER, JUST DESERTS: SENTENCING
BASED ON EQUALITY AND DESERT 1–2 (1979).
38. FRANKEL, supra note 37, at 89–90; SINGER, supra note 37, at 1–2, 10.
39. FRANKEL, supra note 37, at 87.
40. FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 7 (1981); Willard Gaylin &
David J. Rothman, Introduction to ANDREW VON HIRSCH, COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF INCARCERATION,
DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS, at xxxvii (Ne. Univ. Press 1986) (1976).
41. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
42. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
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Court held that a state violated the prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment when it criminalized “a condition [a defendant]
is powerless to change.”43 In Powell, the Court came close to holding
that a state could not criminalize an alcoholic for public drunkenness
because alcoholism was a disease that the alcoholic could not
control.44
The medical model came under attack from the left, right, and
center. Prepared by the American Friends Service Committee,
Struggle for Justice presented a radical attack on the medical model.
It contended that “[m]uch penal reform has been infected
with . . . paternalistic motives.”45 Managers of indeterminate
sentencing and parole used them “as a tool of institutional control.”46
The rehabilitative model, argued the authors, was a product of a class
society. The treatment model allowed the system to treat upper and
middle class criminals favorably because “they are not
revolutionaries.”47 Consistent with the prevailing view at the time,
Struggle for Justice gained traction because of the generally held
view that parole and rehabilitation did not work.48
Conservatives saw the medical model as mollycoddling
criminals.49 They believed in retribution, not rehabilitation.50 Further,
they believed in longer sentences for criminal offenders and for
“truth in sentencing.”51
More centrist in his assessment was Judge Marvin Frankel, whose
book Criminal Sentences highlighted the inequities in the prevailing
sentencing scheme.52 Judges’ discretion was “unchecked and
sweeping,” inconsistent with our professed belief in the rule of law.53
43. Id. at 566–67 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 561–62; Vitiello, supra note 34, at 1016. The four-Justice dissent appears to have been
drafted initially as a majority opinion. Id.
45. AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., supra note 37, at 18.
46. Id. at 28.
47. Id. at 30.
48. Id. at 83–99.
49. Gaylin & Rothman, supra note 40, at xxxvii.
50. Todd R. Clear, Correctional Policy, Neo-Retributionism and the Determinate Sentence, 4 JUST.
SYS. J. 26, 37–41 (1978).
51. Id.
52. FRANKEL, supra note 37.
53. Id. at 5.
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Legislatures left judges without guidance even on fundamental
questions, including why we punish.54 He saw the system as allowing
“untrained, untested, unsupervised men armed with great power [to]
perpetuate abuses.”55 Like the authors of Struggle for Justice, he saw
the parole process as flawed, lacking meaningful standards, and
providing no means of “curing” inmates.56
The emerging consensus culminated in the move towards
sentencing guidelines and commissions. After an unsuccessful effort
to pass legislation in the 1970s,57 Congress enacted the Sentencing
Reform Act in 1984.58 It limited judicial discretion in sentencing by
forcing judges to consider detailed sentencing guidelines.59 The Act
limited judges’ discretion to deviate from the guidelines.60 Judges
were to give written explanations for deviating from the guidelines,
subjecting their decisions to appellate review.61 The Act also
eliminated parole.62
The consensus that led to abandonment of the rehabilitative model
started to fall apart almost immediately. By the time Congress put its
new sentencing scheme into place, law-and-order advocates were
rising in power.63 The victims’ rights movement gained traction
locally and nationally.64 Freed from the constraints of the
rehabilitative model, retributivists called for longer and longer
sentences.65 One needs only to think back to the 1988 presidential
election and President George H. W. Bush’s Willie Horton ad66 to
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 7.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 95.
LISA SEGHETTI & ALISON SMITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32766, FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES: BACKGROUND, LEGAL ANALYSIS, AND POLICY OPTIONS 11 (2007), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32766.pdf.
58. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was enacted as Chapter II of the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1988 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§
3551–3586, 3621–3625, 3742 (2006) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–998 (2006)).
59. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 51 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3220, 3234.
60. 18 U.S.C § 3553(a)–(b) (1988).
61. Id. §§ 3553(c), 3742(a)–(b).
62. Id. § 3624(a)–(b).
63. Clear, supra note 50, at 37–41.
64. JOSHUA PAGE, THE TOUGHEST BEAT 83 (2011).
65. Clear, supra note 50, at 37–41.
66. Editorial, George Bush and Willie Horton, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1988, at A34, available at

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol28/iss4/10

6

Vitiello: Alternatives to Incarceration: Why Is California Lagging Behind?

2012]

ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION

1279

recognize the dramatic shift from Americans’ view of crime in the
1960s and the 1980s. The widespread adoption of three strikes laws
in the 1990s was the culmination of fixed minimum sentences and
exceedingly long prison terms, often for relatively minor offenses.67
These trends have resulted in massive increases in total
incarceration around the country.68 Despite dissatisfaction among
liberals with the result of sentencing reform, the dramatic shift in
sentencing policy was the product of the consensus built in the 1970s,
a consensus which included many liberals.69
I see a similar consensus emerging outside the political arena, a
consensus across a broad political spectrum.70 For most of the past
decade, those groups have recognized that states and the federal
government spend too much on prisons, that mandatory minimum
sentences and long prison sentences are counterproductive, and that
states can maintain public safety without such high levels of spending
on prisons.71
In planning a ten-year retrospective on California’s Three Strikes
law, a colleague and I decided not to focus only on law but to
broaden the inquiry to focus on sentencing reform generally.72
California’s prison budget was out of control even before the worst
of the recession hit the state.73 The problem of prison overcrowding
resulted not just from Three Strikes but also from an extraordinary
number of sentencing enhancement provisions, satisfying the desire
of politicians to address the crime “du jour.”74 Our report discussed
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/11/04/opinion/george-bush-and-willie-horton.html; Willie Horton 1988
Attack Ad, YOUTUBE (Nov. 3, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Io9KMSSEZ0Y.
67. PAGE, supra note 64, at 117–18.
68. Id. at 133. But see VINCENT SCHIRALDI, JASON COLBURN & ERIK LOTKE, JUSTICE POLICY
INST., THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT: AN EXAMINATION OF THE IMPACT OF 3-STRIKE LAWS 10
YEARS
AFTER
THEIR
ENACTMENT,
(2004),
available
at
http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/04-09_rep_threestrikesnatl_ac.pdf.pdf
(stating that as of 2004, fourteen states out of the twenty-two states with Three Strikes laws and
available data had fewer than 100 prisoners sentenced under the Three Strikes laws).
69. Gaylin & Rothman, supra note 40, at xxxvii.
70. See infra notes 81–122 and accompanying text.
71. See infra notes 81–122 and accompanying text.
72. Vitiello & Kelso, supra note 6, at 903.
73. CORR. INDEP. REVIEW PANEL, REFORMING CORRECTIONS, at i-ii (2004), available at
http://www.cpr.ca.gov/Review_Panel/pdf/introto6.pdf; Vitiello & Kelso, supra note 6, at 908–09.
74. Vitiello & Kelso, supra note 6, at 916–17, 921.
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several bipartisan efforts aimed at addressing the crisis of prison
overcrowding and overuse of prison as the only punishment.75
Justice Kennedy’s speech to the American Bar Association (ABA)
in 2003 touched on many of the current system’s excesses.76 He
argued that America spends too much on prisons and that “our
punishments [are] too severe [and] our sentences [are] too long.”77
He urged that federal sentences be revised downward.78 He
questioned the use of mandatory minimum sentences.79 His speech
was a national call to action.80
In response to the challenge, the ABA established a commission
whose report advocated many ideas for reform shared by an
increasing number of experts.81 Representative of several reports
from the mid-2000s, the commission’s report urged the repeal of
mandatory minimum sentences.82 It urged adoption of sentencing
systems that both guide judicial discretion and permit judges to
consider unique characteristics of offenders and their offenses.83 The
commission urged creation of an entity that should monitor the
sentencing system; that entity should urge alternatives to
incarceration for some offenders.84 It should also assess the financial
impact of new legislation on crime rates and racial disparity in
sentencing.85

75. Id. at 952–65.
76. Id. at 909–10; Justice Anthony Kennedy, Speech at the Am. Bar Ass’n Annual Meeting (Aug. 9,
2003), available at http://www.abanow.org/2003/08/speech-by-justice-anthony-kennedy-at-aba-annualmeeting/.
77. See Kennedy, supra note 76.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. AM. BAR ASS’N., JUSTICE KENNEDY COMMISSION, REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS 17
(2004),
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/criminal_justice_section_newsletter/crimjust_k
ennedy_JusticeKennedyCommissionReportsFinal.authcheckdam.pdf; Vitiello & Kelso, supra note 6, at
909–11.
82. AM. BAR ASS’N., supra note 81, at 9.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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Elsewhere, organizations like the American Law Institute (ALI)
have advanced similar proposals.86 For over a decade, a committee of
the ALI, for example, has been working on revisions to the Model
Penal Code sentencing provisions.87 Several principles have
emerged, including disapproval of mandatory minimum sentences;88
evidence-based sentencing;89 proportionality constraints on
sentences;90 procedures to allow “second looks” at long-term
sentences; and modifications of prison sentences based on an
assortment of policies, including advanced age, mental infirmity, and
exigent family circumstances.91
Organizations like the Vera Institute for Justice92 and the Pew
Charitable Trust93 have funded a variety of studies of the prison,
probation, and parole systems. For example, the Vera Institute has
published a detailed report on New York’s use of alternatives to
incarceration.94 It reported that offenders placed in an alternative
program, in which they spent far less time in jail than similar situated
offenders, provided the same level of public protection at a
significantly lower cost.95
The Pew Charitable Trust has been at the forefront of the crisis of
over-incarceration.96 It has identified the problem of overreliance on
incarceration and has funded studies aimed at lowering incarceration
rates while protecting the public.97 Using traditional media, it has
attempted to keep in front of the public positive developments aimed
86. See generally, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011) (outlining
various sentencing reform proposals).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Center on Sentencing and Corrections, VERA INST. JUST., http://www.vera.org/centers/centersentencing-corrections (last visited Dec. 22, 2011).
93. Sentencing
and
Corrections,
PEW
CHARITABLE
TRUSTS,
http://www.pewtrusts.org/our_work_detail.aspx?id=74 (last visited Dec. 22, 2011).
94. RACHEL PORTER, SOPHIA LEE & MARY LUTZ, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, BALANCING
PUNISHMENT AND TREATMENT: ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION IN NEW YORK CITY (2002),
available at http://www.vera.org/download?file=75/Balancing%2520ATI.pdf.
95. Id. at 64–66.
96. See Sentencing and Corrections, supra note 93.
97. See, e.g., PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, supra note 1.
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at those goals.98 In an extensive report published in 2011, the Pew
Center on the States studied recidivism rates around the country.99 It
explored, for example, why Wyoming and Oregon have the lowest
recidivism rates in the country, while California and Minnesota have
the highest.100 It explored why some states have experienced sharp
declines in recidivism while others have experienced sharp increases
in rates of recidivism.101 The report identified the problem of
diminishing returns that states experience when they continue to
expand their prison systems.102 The report provides state officials
interested in sensible use of resources with a variety of strategies,
including reentry strategies that successfully reduce recidivism.103
Before the abandonment of indeterminate sentencing, critics of the
system pointed to evidence that rehabilitation did not work.104 By
comparison, today, those interested in alternatives to prison cite an
increasing body of literature suggesting that many alternatives to
prison do work.105 They can point to a host of innovative programs
that have produced positive results.106 Many of those programs have
been validated with follow-up studies.107 Further, because most such
programs do not resort to prison, they are far less expensive than the
incarceration alternative.108

98. See, e.g., Sue Urahn, How Red-Ink States Should Make Tough Budget Decisions, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR
(Apr.
20,
2011),
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/news_room_detail.aspx?id=85899358938.
99. PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, supra note 1.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 17–23.
102. Id. at 5–6.
103. Id. at 25–32.
104. See AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., supra note 37; FRANKEL, supra note 37, at 89–90; Gaylin &
Rothman, supra note 40, at 45–55. Many critics cited Robert Martinson’s work suggesting that
rehabilitation was a failure. Ironically, by the time Congress and states began abandoning indeterminate
sentencing, Martinson had retracted the conclusions of his earlier work. Robert Martinson, New
Findings, New Views: A Note of Caution Regarding Sentencing Reform, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 243, 252
(1979).
105. See MARK A. KLEIMAN, WHEN BRUTE FORCE FAILS: HOW TO HAVE LESS CRIME AND LESS
PUNISHMENT 35–48 (2009); PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, supra note 1, at 25–32.
106. See KLEIMAN, supra note 105, at 35–48; PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, supra note 1, at 25–32.
107. See PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, supra note 1.
108. KLEIMAN, supra note 105, at 34.
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As developed below,109 campaigning by portraying one’s opponent
as “soft on crime” remains attractive to some politicians. But outside
the political arena, some conservatives have joined the call for
sentencing reform. Several years ago, prominent California
conservative Ward Connerly published an op-ed piece in which he
laid out a conservative’s argument for sentencing reform.110 Other
prominent conservatives soon echoed Connerly’s position.
In January 2011, Newt Gingrich and Pat Nolan authored an op-ed
in The Washington Post summarizing a major shift in conservative
thinking about crime in the United States.111 Some prominent
conservative leaders, including Gingrich and Connerly, have become
part of the Right on Crime campaign, a movement which calls for
“sensible and proven reforms to our criminal justice system—policies
that will cut prison costs while keeping the public safe.”112 While few
current politicians have signed on to the campaign, signatories
include powerful political players, including former Attorney General
Ed Meese, former drug czar Asa Hutchinson, and anti-tax leader
Grover Norquist.113 The Right on Crime webpage lists former Florida
Governor Jeb Bush as its most recent signatory.114 According to
Gingrich and Nolan, this initiative “opens the way for a commonsense left-right agreement on an issue that has kept the parties apart
for decades.”115
The Right on Crime campaign has roots in traditional conservative
thought. For example, conservatives expect government
accountability for programs that it runs.116 As observed on Right on
Crime’s webpage: “As members of the nation’s conservative
109. See infra text accompanying notes 110–20.
110. Ward Connerly, Don’t Raise Taxes, But Reform Prisons, Special to the Sacramento Bee, Sept. 4,
2009, at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/PrisonNewsNetwork/message/38110.
111. Newt Gingrich & Pat Nolan, Op-Ed., Prison Reform: A Smart Way for States to Save Money and
Lives,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
7,
2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2011/01/06/AR2011010604386.html.
112. Id. For a complete list of the signatories, see Statement of Principles: National Signatories,
RIGHT ON CRIME, http://www.rightoncrime.com/the-conservative-case-for-reform/statement-ofprinciples/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2011).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Gingrich & Nolan, supra note 111.
116. Statement of Principles: National Signatories, supra note 112.
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movement, we strongly support constitutionally limited government,
transparency, individual liberty, personal responsibility, and free
enterprise.”117 While liberals and centrists may not join all of the
proposals supported by the Right on Crime campaign,118 those
signing on to the campaign concur in the core of the message
emerging elsewhere. In calling for more cost-effective approaches to
criminal justice spending, the website lists as an example of
ineffective governmental spending “our reliance on prisons, which
serve a critical role by incapacitating dangerous offenders but are not
the solution for every type of offender. And in some instances, they
have the unintended consequence of hardening nonviolent, low-risk
offenders–making them greater risk to the public than when they
entered.”119
At least on several key issues, a consensus has emerged across a
broad political spectrum, similar to the consensus that emerged
briefly in the 1970s, which in turn led to sentencing reform.120 I do
not want to overstate the case. Politics have changed since the 1970s
and 1980s. The Republicans’ performance in the summer of 2011,
when they held the nation hostage before voting to raise the debt
ceiling, suggests how far we have come from what now seems like a
kinder, gentler era when conservative icon Ronald Reagan was
President.121 But at least outside of the political arena, a consensus
has emerged that America overuses incarceration and reform is
necessary.
III. RED STATE BLUE STATE: REFORM CAN HAPPEN
As I indicated in the previous section, some prominent
conservatives have joined the emerging consensus supporting

117. Id.
118. For example, among their proposals is an endorsement of faith-based initiatives. Id.
119. Id.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 34–69.
121. President Barack Obama, Speech on the Debt Limit (July 25, 2011), available at
http://washingtonexaminer.com/blogs/beltway-confidential/2011/07/transcript-obamas-speech-debtlimit.
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sentencing reform.122 Critics have come to that recognition for
different policy reasons.123 Nonetheless, critics of the overuse of
incarceration have identified a handful of concrete proposals whereby
states can reduce prison costs without endangering public safety.124
This section reviews developments taking place in different states.125
Faced with financial exigencies, policy makers have begun to look
for ways to reduce prison costs.126 Some state legislators have
adopted some of the ideas advanced by critics of the current system
of incarceration.127 Reforms have taken place in some unlikely
places. This section reviews some of the reforms adopted in a
traditionally blue state, Washington,128 and then reviews reforms in
two states known for their conservative politics, Texas129 and
Mississippi.130
A. Washington’s Reform
Similar to California, Washington experienced dramatic prison
population growth in the 1990s and early 2000s after the passage of a
“Three Strikes and You’re Out” law and a “Hard Time for Armed
Crime” law (similar to California’s 10-20-Life law).131 But unlike
California, Washington has reformed its sentencing laws, parole
mechanisms, and earned-time mechanisms. This subsection discusses
122. See supra text accompanying notes 109–22.
123. Charlie Savage, Trend to Lighten Harsh Sentences Catches On in Conservative States, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/13/us/13penal.html?_r=3&hpw.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 93–108.
125. This section does not discuss some of the earlier efforts at reform. During the move toward
sentencing guidelines, some states recognized that their prison resources were finite and that they
needed to make better use of those resources. Some states like North Carolina and Virginia were able to
limit prison growth without sacrificing public safety by designating prison beds for violent offenders.
Sentencing:
Guidelines—Guidelines
and
Prison
Population,
LAW
LIBRARY,
http://law.jrank.org/pages/2067/Sentencing-Guidelines-Guidelines-prison-populations.html (last visited
Dec. 22, 2011).
126. Savage, supra note 123.
127. Id.
128. See infra text accompanying notes 131–43.
129. See infra text accompanying notes 155–76.
130. See infra text accompanying notes 144–54.
131. Vincent Schiraldi, The Modern American Penal System: Digging Out as U.S. States Begin to
Reduce Prison Use, Can American Turn the Corner on its Imprisonment Binge?, 24 PACE L. REV. 563,
572–73 (2004).
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some of the reforms Washington has made to curb prison population
growth.
Even though Washington is one of many states with a truth-insentencing law, the Washington Legislature passed Senate Bill 44,
which “increased the amount of earned-release time available to most
drug and property offenders from 33 to 50 percent of their
sentences.”132 Additionally, in an attempt to lower the recidivism
rate, Washington also passed legislation dedicating $3 million to prerelease treatment programs.133 It is estimated that this legislation will
save the state $40 million over a two-year period.134
Another reform bill passed by the legislature, House Bill 2194,
authorizes the early release of certain individuals if they meet
specified criteria. A form of compassionate release, this law
considers the risk to the community of early release, the cost of
medical treatment, and the estimated savings to the state.135
Washington reduced the number of parolees reentering the prison
system for technical parole violations by passing Senate Bill 5990,
which effectively discontinued supervision of released low-level
felons.136 The Washington legislature enacted the Washington
Sentencing Commission (the Commission) in 1981 with the passage
of the Sentencing Reform Act.137 The legislature created a sentencing
commission dependent on the state legislature, gave the Commission
only advisory power, and the Commission is required to consider
prison resources and prison capacity when recommending guidelines
to the state legislature.138

132. Don Stemen & Jon Wool, Changing Fortunes or Changing Attitudes? Sentencing and
Corrections Reforms in 2003, 16 FED. SENT. R. 294, 297 (2004).
133. Id. at 304.
134. JUDITH A. GREENE, FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, POSITIVE TRENDS IN STATELEVEL
SENTENCING
AND
CORRECTIONS
POLICY
7
(2003),
available
at
http://www.famm.org/Repository/Files/82751_Positive%20Trends.pdf.
135. NICOLE D. PORTER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE STATE OF SENTENCING 2009:
DEVELOPMENTS
IN
POLICY
AND
PRACTICE
14
(2010),
available
at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/s_ssr2009Update.pdf.
136. Stemen & Wool, supra note 132, at 298.
137. Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 777 (2005).
138. Id. at 780.
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Although the Commission has no power to implement policy or
enact legislation, the Commission has had an impact on Washington
state prison reform.139 For example, the Commission’s guidelines
influenced the Washington legislature’s enactment of alternative
treatment programs for drug offenders such as Senate Bill 5990.140
Further, after reviewing a report published by the Commission in
2001, which analyzed and reviewed the sentencing laws and
treatment programs, the legislature enacted reforms that saved the
state an estimated $45 million per year.141
Not only did Senate Bill 5990 reform the parole system in
Washington, the bill also reformed the sentencing of drug offenders
across the board. The law, which implemented the Drug Sentence
Reform Act of 2002, “significantly reduces sentences for all drug
offenses.”142 Met with the same fiscal challenges as other states,
Washington passed these sentencing reforms with bipartisan support.
These reforms, spearheaded by Washington Corrections Secretary
Joseph Lehman, included treatment for low-level, nonviolent drug
offenders, to be managed and supervised by drug court judges instead
of prison wardens. Additionally, the reform package reduced
sentences for prisoners convicted of drug trafficking. This particular
reform package was estimated to save the state “almost $75 million
in correctional costs and avert the need to build more than 2,000 new
prison cells.”143
B. Mississippi’s Reform
Although Mississippi is one of the most conservative states in the
nation, the state has made significant strides toward reducing its
prison population and reforming its prison system. Mississippi
expanded its early release mechanism, releasing 1,300 inmates in
2008-2009 alone. Mississippi Department of Corrections
Commissioner Chris Epps is largely responsible for reducing
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
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Mississippi’s prison population and reforming sentencing laws. In
2008, Epps spearheaded an effort to amend Mississippi’s truth-insentencing law to allow nonviolent inmates to serve only 25% of
their sentence before “becoming eligible for release,” compared to
the original 85%.144 To further reduce Mississippi’s prison
population, the legislature enacted Senate Bill 2039, removing the
cap on earned time for inmates participating and completing
educational programs.145 The previous law capped earned time at “10
days off of their sentence for 30 days participation,” and the
maximum amount of earned time was capped at 180 days off their
sentence.146 Senate Bill 2039 removed both caps.147 Additionally,
Mississippi expanded the state’s compassionate release mechanism
by passing House Bill 494. The new law mandates that nonviolent,
terminally-ill offenders are eligible for release, “regardless of the
time served on their sentence.”148
To further save space in the prisons for violent offenders,
Mississippi invested in alternatives to traditional incarceration.
Mississippi’s most significant reforms have been in the area of house
arrest. In 2009, Mississippi approved house arrest for 518 drug
offenders—prior to 2009 “most drug offenders didn’t qualify for
house arrest.”149 It was estimated that such a change in law would
save the state $5 million annually.150 In addition to providing another
alternative to traditional incarceration, Mississippi’s restitution
centers have many other benefits. Restitution centers allow inmates
convicted of property crimes to “work to repay the victims they owe”
at “less than half the cost of the State Penitentiary.”151 Not only do
144. Jimmie E. Gates, Inmates Get Early Release, CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), Nov. 29, 2009,
available at 2009 WLNR 24110992.
145. PORTER, supra note 135, at 13.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 13–14.
148. RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE STATE OF SENTENCING 2008: DEVELOPMENTS
POLICY
AND
PRACTICE
5
(2009),
available
at
IN
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/sl_statesentencingreport2008.pdf.
149. Gates, supra note 144.
150. Id.
151. Jerry Mitchell, Lawmakers Look To Stave Off Prison Overcrowding, CLARION-LEDGER
(Jackson, Miss.), Dec. 12, 2000, at 1A.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol28/iss4/10

16

Vitiello: Alternatives to Incarceration: Why Is California Lagging Behind?

2012]

ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION

1289

the restitution programs save the state money, but they also provide
rehabilitation, allowing the inmates to keep a portion of their
earnings and opening opportunities for employment.152 Both
alternatives to imprisonment have successfully helped to reduce
Mississippi prison populations and thereby save the state money.
At one time Mississippi was one of the nation’s “most aggressive
incarcerators”; now Mississippi is reaping the rewards of its reforms.
Not only has Mississippi reduced “its corrections budget by about
5%” since 2008, it did so with little danger to the public.153
Mississippi’s violent crime rates have fallen “toward 1970s levels,
and the state’s recidivism rate has decreased to 30% in the last four
years—well below the national average.”154
C. Texas’s Reform
Another conservative state, Texas, could no longer afford to build
new prisons without questioning the underlying system. The reforms
in Texas are indicative of a new movement on the right—epitomized
by the group “Right on Crime”—preaching fiscal responsibility over
the old “lock ‘em up and throw away the key” approach. Texas has
invested in alternatives to incarceration, reformed its parole system,
made early-release and earned-release reforms, and made reforms to
juvenile sentencing, all with positive impacts on Texans’ safety and
pocket books.
Texas prevented the construction of additional prisons by investing
in alternatives to traditional incarceration. Where some states have
invested in house arrest devices (such as Mississippi), Texas has
invested in transitional programs for inmates, specifically “treatmentoriented programs.”155 Texas “allocated $241 million for residential
and non-residential treatment-oriented programs for non-violent

152. Id.
153. Steven Gray, Why Mississippi Is Reversing Its Prison Policy, TIME (June 10, 2011),
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,2077089,00.html.
154. Id.
155. State Initiatives: Texas, RIGHT ON CRIME, http://www.rightoncrime.com/reform-in-action/stateinitiatives/texas/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2011).
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offenders, along with enhancing in-prison treatment programs.”156
The Texas legislature continued funding for the programs in 2009
and expanded the services provided by hiring more reentry
transitional coordinators.157
Another important way Texas avoided the need for additional
prisons was House Bill 2668.158 With the passage of House Bill
2668, first-time drug offenders possessing less than one gram of
drugs receive mandatory probation versus prison time.159
Additionally, the law gives judges the discretion to sentence
probation with treatment for drug possession offenders that have
prior felony convictions.160 The estimated savings of this law alone
are $30 million over a five-year period and a reduction of the prison
population by 2,500.161
Not only has Texas reformed its sentencing laws by expanding the
number of offenders eligible for probation, the state has also
implemented reforms to the parole system, reducing the number of
parolees returning to state prison. In a little over a year, the Texas
prison population decreased by 8,000 inmates because of parole
reforms implemented in 2000.162 Texas “created a network of
intermediate sanctions in lieu of parole revocation,” while the Texas
Parole Board exercised their “release powers.”163 Such changes
dramatically affected the Texas prison population and the Texas
budget.
With the passage of House Bill 93,164 inmates can regain their
good time forfeited by “cooperation or good behavior” while
incarcerated.165 Previously, once good time credit was forfeited, an

156. Id.
157. Richard Fausset, Conservatives Latch Onto Prison Reform, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2011),
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/28/nation/la-na-conservative-crime-20110129.
158. H.R. 2668, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2003).
159. State Initiatives: Texas, supra note 135.
160. Stemen & Wool, supra note 132, at 299.
161. Id.
162. Schiraldi, supra note 131, at 577–78.
163. Id.
164. H.R. 93, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2010).
165. PORTER, supra note 135, at 14.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol28/iss4/10

18

Vitiello: Alternatives to Incarceration: Why Is California Lagging Behind?

2012]

ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION

1291

inmate could not earn back the credit.166 Not only will this change in
the law positively impact an inmate’s behavior while incarcerated, it
will also have some impact on reducing the prison population
(though no estimates were provided).
The Texas Legislature enacted Senate Bill 839167 in 2009,
eliminating juvenile sentences of life without parole.168 Senate Bill
839 corrected previous law that placed all juvenile offenders
convicted of capital offenses in the sentencing category of life
without parole by default.169 With the passage of Senate Bill 839, a
juvenile “serving a life sentence for a capital offense is eligible for
parole after he or she has completed 40 years of their sentence.”170
All of Texas’s prison reforms have amounted to less violent
crimes, less inmates, and less of the state budget going to corrections.
Texas reforms are hailed as a model for other conservative states
looking to implement prison reforms to save money.171 Texas crime
rates have declined since the implementation of the above-discussed
reform packages, even when other states on average saw an increase
in incarceration rates.172
Serious property, violent, and sex crimes per 100,000
Texas residents have declined 12.8 percent since 2003.
Such crimes per 100,000 residents fell 7.3 percent from
2005 to 2008. From 2007 to 2008, there was a 5 percent
drop in murders, a 4.3 percent drop in robberies, and a 6.8
percent decline in forcible rapes. The number of parolees
convicted of a new crime declined 7.6 percent from 2007 to
2008, despite an increase in the number of parolees. The
2008 per capita crime rate in Dallas was at its lowest level
in 40 years, declining 10 percent from 2007. It dropped

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
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another 10.7 percent through August 31, 2009.173
And with crime and incarceration rates on the decline for Texas,
Texas has saved an estimated $2 billion by reforming the existing
prison system in lieu of expanding it.174
Serious criminologists often confess uncertainty about what causes
the decline in crime rates.175 But the results from states like
Washington, Mississippi, and Texas, among other states, are
encouraging.176 They demonstrate that reform efforts can cut costs
without impairing public safety. What about California, a state that is
struggling financially and that has the largest prison system in the
nation? Can it achieve similarly meaningful sentencing reforms?
IV. BROWN V. PLATA: CALIFORNIA’S CHANCE AT REFORM?
A panel of three federal judges may have given California its best
shot at meaningful sentencing reform. This section discusses briefly
the litigation in Brown v. Plata177 and explores how it may provide
California with the opportunity to reform its broken system.178
The Court’s decision in Brown v. Plata involved consolidated
cases. Filed in 1990 as a class action, Coleman v. Brown challenged
the legality of the mental health care provided by the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR).179 Coleman
resulted in a finding that the mental healthcare provided by the prison
system violated inmates’ Eighth Amendment rights. The court
entered an injunction in 1995 and appointed a special master to
173. State Initiatives: Texas, supra note 155.
174. Fausset, supra note 157.
175. ZIMRING, supra note 2, at 23–24; Franklin Zimring: “The Decline in Crime in New York City,”
VERA INST. JUST. (Oct. 29, 2010), http://www.vera.org/videos/franklin-zimring-decline-crime-newyork-city.
176. PORTER, supra note 135, at 13–14.
177. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
178. See infra text accompanying notes 205–15.
179. Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D. Cal. 1995). The California Department of
Corrections changed its name to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation in 2005.
Sara B. Miller, California Prison Boom Ends, Signaling a Shift in Priorities, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR
(June 20, 2005), http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0620/p03s02-usju.html.
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determine the state’s compliance with the injunction. The special
master’s repeated interim reports found a “troubling reversal in the
progress of the remedial efforts of the preceding decade.”180
Filed as a class action in 2001, Plata v. Brown challenged the
adequacy of health care provided by the CDCR.181 The complaint
included a host of grievances about the system, including inadequate
screening of prisoners, untimely health care in response to
emergencies, lack of competent medical personnel, and lack of
adequate review of the care that physicians did provide.182 The
plaintiffs alleged that inadequate medical care resulted in over thirty
deaths.183 In 2002, after the parties negotiated a stipulation for
injunctive relief, the court entered an order requiring the CDCR to
provide the minimum level of care consistent with the Eighth
Amendment.184
To carry out this order, the court appointed a receiver to take over
the prison health care system.185 Three years later, the court found
continued existence of appalling conditions resulting from the failure
of CDCR to provide even minimally acceptable medical care.186 The
continued failure of the state led the plaintiffs to petition for the
appointment of a three-judge panel, an order that was granted.187
After extensive proceedings, including a fourteen-day trial, the
three-judge panel ordered the defendants to submit a plan to reduce
the state’s prison population within two years.188 The state had to
reduce the population to 137.5% of the design capacity.189 The court
based its order to reduce the prison population on the finding that
180. Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520LKKJFMP, 2009 WL 2430820, at *17 (E.D.
Cal. 2009).
181. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1917.
182. Id. at 1926–27.
183. See Karen Gullo, California Must Reduce Inmate Population, U.S. Judges Rule, BLOOMBERG
(Feb.
10,
2009,
12:01
AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aogBNJsZBpSY&refer=us (noting that
thirty-four California prisoners died because of inadequate care).
184. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1926–27.
185. Id. at 1926.
186. Id. at 1927.
187. Id. at 1928.
188. Id.
189. Id.

Published by Reading Room, 2012

21

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 10

1294

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:4

overcrowding and poor health care led to the harm suffered by
members of the class.190 Over the period of the litigation, the prison
population averaged 190% of the system’s designed capacity.191
Despite headlines to the contrary,192 the three-judge panel did not
order the release of prisoners. Instead, while it recommended
reductions in the population, for example, by reducing the
imprisonment of nonviolent offenders, it did not compel the manner
in which the state had to comply with the order.193 Further, the threejudge panel indicated frustration with the state’s repeated failures to
comply with previous orders.194
Decided by a vote of 5–4, Brown v. Plata upheld the lower court
order.195 Justice Kennedy’s opinion recounted some of the horrible
conditions that resulted from overcrowding, including as many as
fifty sick inmates held in twelve-by-twenty foot cages for up to five
hours while they awaited medical treatment, fifty-four prisoners
sharing a single toilet, a suicide rate nearly twice the national average
for prisons, and waiting periods of up to a year to get mental health
care.196 While the Court affirmed the lower court, it noted the state’s
options other than releasing prisoners.197
Justice Kennedy returned to themes he raised in his 2003 speech to
the ABA. He discussed findings by experts on crime and punishment,
including raising questions about mass incarceration and public
safety.198 He contrasted the experience in other states, some of which
have reduced their prison populations without impairing public

190. Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520LKKJFMP, 2009 WL 2430820, at *32–33
(E.D. Cal. 2009).
191. Id. at *31.
192. Mary Ratcliff, Federal Judges Tentatively Order Release of 37,000 to 58,000 California
Prisoners, S.F. BAY VIEW (Feb. 9, 2009), http://sfbayview.com/2009/federal-judges-tentatively-orderrelease-of-37000-to-58000-california-prisoners/.
193. Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820, at *84.
194. Id.
195. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011).
196. Id. at 1923–25.
197. Id. at 1929. Justice Kennedy identified that those options included sending prisoners out of state.
Id.
198. Id. at 1942–43.
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safety.199 He cited studies suggesting that prisons may be
crimogenic.200
Given the protracted litigation in Plata, the state has had years to
seek solutions to overcrowding.201 The three-judge panel and
Supreme Court decisions still leave open the opportunity to repetition the court if it cannot comply with the order.202 In the next
section, I explore California’s response to Plata and other
developments in the state.203 At this point, Plata contains good and
bad news for reform-minded observers of the system.
Obviously, the majority kept some pressure on the state to reform
its prison system and, perhaps, its sentencing scheme.204 A contrary
holding would have allowed the state to go back to its old habits of
largely ignoring the problem by providing a few minor reforms.
A less obvious benefit of Justice Kennedy’s opinion can be seen in
his endorsement of social science research.205 Policymakers have
ignored social scientists and academic lawyers for many years. Frank
Zimring and his co-authors summarized the problem in Punishment
and Democracy: Three Strikes and You’re Out in California:
[E]xpert influence on the process and expert involvement in
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1943.
201. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1930–31.
202. Id. at 1947–48. In addition to the extensive record from trial, in an amicus brief filed by
Corrections and Law Enforcement Personnel, eleven former prison system directors and six former
federal judges signed a brief in support of the plaintiffs. Brief of Corrections and Law Enforcement
Personnel Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees at 4–5, Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011) (No. 091233). They believed that “crowding can be reduced without jeopardizing public safety.” Id. Despite
those views and the extensive record amassed at trial and despite the majority’s assurances that the state
had options to a massive release of prisoners, Justice Alito argued the majority required “the premature
release of approximately 46,000 criminals—the equivalent of three Army divisions.” Brown, 131 S. Ct.
at 1959 (Alito, J., dissenting). Further, he accused the Court of “gambling with the safety of the people
of California.” Id. at 1967–68. Justice Scalia invoked the specter that among the prisoners released will
be “many . . . fine physical specimens who have developed intimidating muscles pumping iron in the
prison gym.” Id. at 1953 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Beyond a quibble with Justice Scalia, who was unaware
that California punitively outlawed weights in prisons in 1997, Justices Scalia and Alito’s rhetoric is
demagoguery. As indicated earlier, even many of their conservative admirers reject their overblown
claims.
203. See discussion infra Part V.
204. As developed below, meaningful reform is hardly a foregone conclusion.
205. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1942–43.
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the process have declined. . . . [For example, t]he Model
Penal Code effort of the American Law Institute brought
the best and the brightest in academic law into the process
of substantive criminal law reform. But there is now a large
gap between law professors and the legislative
process. . . . Part of the problem is that most academic
lawyers are not much interested in criminal justice policy
processes. Most of the problem is that there is no demand
for what experts have to offer, which is information about
the implications and consequences of policy choices.206
Led by Justice Kennedy, the Plata majority seemed open to
rethinking the role of experts in formulating criminal justice
policy.207 In effect, Plata gives credence to the kinds of studies cited
above, indicating that alternatives to prison work.208
The bad news in Plata can be found in its fragile majority. Perhaps
to hold together the slim majority, Justice Kennedy’s opinion
suggests a host of alternatives open to the state that fall short of
forcing the state to enact meaningful sentencing reform.209 Further,
Plata hedges on the timing of final implementation of the three-judge
panel’s order.210 That may take additional pressure off the state if it
believes that it can go back to its old habits of delay. While I lack a
crystal ball, post-Plata developments fall short of the broader reform
needed by the state.
V. CALIFORNIA’S RESPONSE
Even before Plata, commentators have speculated that California’s
budget crisis would force the state to consider comprehensive
sentencing reform. For example, I, along with several co-authors,
206. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL., PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE
OUT IN CALIFORNIA 13 (2001).
207. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1942–45.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 93–108.
209. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1929.
210. Id. at 1945–46.
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speculated in 2004 that “California’s budget woes provide an
opportunity to reexamine policies that have led to dramatic prison
increases. The California budget has few areas of discretionary
spending. Further, the prison budget is one budget item that has
undergone little scrutiny.”211 Prior to Plata, however, California’s
efforts at reform had been tepid at best. As indicated above,212 Plata
may provide the state with the impetus to tackle sentencing reform.
This section reviews the limited efforts at reform prior to Plata213 and
the state’s short-term response to Plata.214
Faced with similar budgetary crises over a decade ago, several
states used sentencing commissions to allocate limited prison
resources.215 Notably, states like North Carolina have been able to
reallocate prison resources, reserving longer sentences for violent
offenders, without endangering the public.216
By comparison, efforts at creating a sentencing commission in
California have gone nowhere. Such efforts have had a great deal of
academic support,217 as well as support from various non-partisan
organizations like the Little Hoover Institute.218 For example,
Stanford’s Criminal Justice Center sponsored executive sessions on
sentencing reform that brought together participants from various
backgrounds, including academics, policymakers, politicians, and
members of several organizations like the California Correctional
Peace Officers Association (CCPOA) that have a stake in sentencing
reform.219 But that kind of reform has floundered in the political
arena. Various Democratic legislators have proposed legislation
211. Vitiello & Kelso, supra note 6, at 908–09.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 177–210.
213. See infra text accompanying notes 215–27.
214. See infra text accompanying notes 228–52.
215. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6A introductory cmt., at 40 (Preliminary Draft No. 1,
2002) (noting Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Washington, Delaware, Oregon, Kansas, North Carolina,
Virginia, and Ohio as states with successful sentencing commissions).
216. Id. § 6A.01 (Preliminary Draft No. 1, 2002) (noting Delaware, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina
allocate more funding to intermediate punishments to avoid prison sentences).
217. THE STANFORD EXEC. SESSIONS ON SENTENCING & CORRS., THE CALIFORNIA SENTENCING
COMMISSION: LAYING THE GROUNDWORK 3 (2007); Vitiello & Kelso, supra note 6, at 960.
218. LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, SOLVING CALIFORNIA’S CORRECTIONS CRISIS: TIME IS RUNNING
OUT 33–48 (2007), available at http://www.lhc.ca.gov/studies/185/Report185.pdf
219. THE STANFORD EXEC. SESSIONS ON SENTENCING & CORRS., supra note 217.
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creating a commission.220 At one point, then-Governor
Schwarzenegger proposed a sentencing commission.221 Those efforts
went nowhere.222
California does have in place a compassionate release program,
allowing the Parole Hearings Board to order the release of terminally
ill prisoners.223 But as some recent headlines make clear, the board is
hardly opening the prison doors.224 At various times, the legislature
has considered a more general program for older prisoners.225 Those
efforts have gone nowhere,226 despite an aging prison population that
is expensive to maintain.227
Thus far, California’s primary response to Plata has been the
enactment of Assembly Bill 109, the Public Safety Realignment
Act.228 Importantly, Assembly Bill 109 became law without a single
Republican member of the legislature voting for it.229 The legislation
220. Jenifer Warren, Democrats Offer Plan to Overhaul Sentencing: Lawmakers Recommend
Creating a Panel that Would Set Prison Terms to Ease Overcrowding, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2007, at 1,
available at 2007 WLNR 1060787.
221. CAL. DEPT. OF FINANCE, CALIFORNIA’S GOVERNOR’S BUDGET 2007–08 PROPOSED BUDGET
SUMMARY: CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION 185 (2007), available at http://200708.archives.ebudget.ca.gov/pdf/BudgetSummary/CorrectionsandRehabilitation.pdf.
222. Marisa Lagos, Political Will for Reform is Lacking: California Lags Behind in Reducing
Incarceration, S.F. CHRON., June 13, 2011, A1, available at 2011 WLNR 11758764.
223. Assem. 29, 1997–1998 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997).
224. Leticia Juarez, Judge Blocks Path for Release of Inmate With Terminal Cancer, KABC INLAND
EMPIRE
NEWS
(Oct.
11,
2011),
http://abclocal.go.com/kabc/story?section=news/local/inland_empire&id=8388006;
Limiting
California’s
‘Compassionate
Release’
Program,
L.A.
TIMES
(Oct.
22,
2011),
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/22/opinion/la-ed-compassion-20111022. But see Tracy Wilson,
Murderer Dying of Cancer Gains Release From Prison, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2003),
http://articles.latimes.com/2003/sep/20/local/me-spragin20.
225. See Testimony Before the H. Subcomm., supra note 17 (statement of Jonathan Turley).
226. See Helen Rippier Wheeler, Senior Power: “Graying Prison,” Early Release, and ‘Assisted
Living,’
BERKELEY
DAILY
PLANET
(Jan.
03,
2011,
5:01
PM),
http://www.berkeleydailyplanet.com/issue/2011-01-05/article/37048?headline=Senior-Power-Grayingprisons-early-release-and-assisted-living-.
227. See Testimony Before the H. Subcomm., supra note 17. Even Mississippi has already netted
significant savings by resort to early medical release. Prison Early Release Program Saving Mississippi
Millions, CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), Oct. 2, 2011, at A1, available at 2011 WLNR 21133956.
228. Assem. 109, 2011–2012 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011). Assembly Bill 117 amended Assembly Bill 109
and delayed the operative date of Assembly Bill 117. CAL. STATE ASS’N OF COUNTIES ET AL., 2011
PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT (2011), available at http://www.cpoc.org/php/realign/CSAC-CSSACPOC%20(22%20July%202011)%20update%20on%20AB%20109-AB%20117.pdf.
229. AB 109 Criminal Justice Realignment—Voting Record, PROJECT VOTE SMART (Mar. 17, 2011),
http://www.votesmart.org/bill/votes/34132. Project Vote Smart, AB 109 Criminal Justice Realignment –
Voting Record, Project Vote Smart (Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.votesmart.org/bill/votes/34134
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does not require the release of currently incarcerated prisoners.230 It
does shift responsibility from the state to county governments in a
number of areas.
Instead of sending many lower level, non-violent felons and parole
violators to state prisons, the Act now shifts responsibility for those
offenders to the counties.231 The proponents of realignment intend the
Act to do more than simply shift responsibility for prisoners from the
state to the counties. The legislative findings noted the high
recidivism rate in California.232 Assembly Bill 109, therefore,
encourages local governments to use evidence-based sanctions and
programs “encompassing a range of custodial and noncustodial
responses to criminal or noncompliant offender activity.”233 While
providing the counties with additional funds, the Act envisions local
governments saving money by shifting to less expensive
interventions, like drug treatment, home arrest and other alternatives
to jail and prison.234 The law also encourages counties to adopt a
variety of other cost-savings alternatives, including alternatives to
expensive booking and arraignment processes. Instead, counties may
direct consenting offenders directly into treatment programs.235 The
law also includes a recommendation that local governments adopt
evidence-based reentry programs addressing housing, education,
employment, and health status of individuals released back into the

230. See Assem. 109, 2011–2012 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011); Assem. 117, 2011–2012 Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2011); Ryan Vaillancourt, State Prison Shift Puts Skid Row at Risk, L.A. DOWNTOWN NEWS (Nov. 4,
2011), http://www.ladowntownnews.com/news/state-prison-shift-puts-skid-row-atrisk/article_6ba8a322-0737-11e1-bd51-001cc4c002e0.html.
231. Assem. 109, 2011–2012 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011); Assem. 117, 2011–2012 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011).
232. Assem. 117, 2011–2012 Reg. Sess. § 5 (Cal. 2011) (to be codified at CAL. PENAL CODE
17.5(a)(2)).
233. See id. (to be codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a)(8)).
234. Niko Kyriakou, Ruling on Prison Overcrowding Could Slam San Mateo County Jails, S.F.
EXAMINER (June 11, 2011, 8:00 AM), http://www.sfexaminer.com/local/peninsula/2011/06/rulingprison-overcrowding-could-slam-san-mateo-county-jails.
235. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF CALIFORNIA, COMMUNITY SAFETY, COMMUNITY
SOLUTIONS:
IMPLEMENTING
AB
109,
at
12–13
(2011),
available
at http://www.aclunc.org/issues/criminal_justice/asset_upload_file459_10684.pdf. Assembly Bill 109’s
drafters borrowed the concept from a similar program adopted in Seattle. Id. at 13. Assembly Bill 109’s
drafters borrowed the concept from a similar program adopted in Seattle. Id. at 13.
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community.236 Again, the expectation of the drafters of the law is that
such programs will reduce recidivism.237
The Act also requires counties to develop implementation plans.238
Reminding county officials that the Brown Act requires open
meetings,239 the law anticipates participation of stakeholders,
including providers of health, drug treatments, and other social
services along with local business interests.240
Realignment holds some promise. Policymakers seem to have
taken notice of some of the current trends elsewhere. For example,
although not directly requiring evidence-based practices, the law
encourages counties to adopt such practices.241 In addition, it
suggests adoption of practices found effective at reducing recidivism
in other jurisdictions.242 As discussed above, adopting similar
programs elsewhere has led to dramatically lower recidivism rates.243
What’s not to like about such a law? Critics of the law come from
a number of perspectives. Some fear that the state’s financial
commitment to the counties will be short-lived.244 My concerns are
two-fold. My first concern is that the state left too much discretion to
county governments, leaving in place the conditions that lead to
unequal enforcement of the law. Similar policies have led to much
higher incarceration rates for minority men.245
My second criticism of realignment is what the law did not do. It
left on the table numerous more ambitious measures that would have
236. Id. at 11–12.
237. Id. at 11.
238. Id. at 8. Some of those plans are available online. See, e.g., AB 109 Implementation Information,
CAL.
MENTAL
HEALTH
DIRECTORS
ASS’N,
http://www.cmhda.org/go/Committees/ForensicsCommittee/AB109ImplementationInformation.aspx
(last visited Dec. 28, 2011) (providing links to Butte County, Merced County, and San Francisco County
implementation plans).
239. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 54950 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 8 of 2012 Reg. Sess.).
240. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 235, at 9.
241. Assem. 109, 2011–2012 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011); Assem. 117, 2011–2012 Reg. Sess. § 5 (Cal.
2011) (to be codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5).
242. Assem. 109, 2011–2012 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011).
243. See supra text accompanying notes 133–57.
244. Chris Meagher, S.B. Braces for Inmate Influx, SANTA BARBARA INDEP. (Sept. 22, 2011),
http://www.independent.com/news/2011/sep/22/sb-braces-inmate-influx/.
245. SCOTT EHLERS, VINCENT SCHIRALDI & ERIC LOTKE, JUSTICE POLICY INST., RACIAL DIVIDE
(2004), available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/04-10_tac_caracialdivide_ac-rd.pdf.
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provided the state with a more rational sentencing scheme and would
have made greater savings in prison costs. Despite some confusion in
the public’s mind,246 the law did not require the state to release
anyone currently in prison.247 It does not address the unnecessarily
expensive and sometimes unfair treatment of sex offenders.248 The
law does not allow county-level supervision for third-strike offenders
or any individual with a serious or violent offense.249 Finally, it does
not put in place for the prison population about to be released similar
evidence-based practices aimed at reducing that cohort’s recidivism
rates.250
If my conclusions are correct, California missed a unique
opportunity to achieve much broader reforms. As developed in
Section II above, the opportunity for broad sentencing reform occurs
infrequently, when broad consensus emerges across the political
divide.251 The discussion above begs another question: Why has it
been so difficult for California, on many measures a progressive
state, to enact broad reforms? I take up that as the topic for the final
section.252
VI. ELUSIVE REFORM
As discussed above, some conservative states like Mississippi and
Texas have adopted some progressive reforms in light of financial
constraints.253 Over a decade ago, states less progressive than
California, like North Carolina and Virginia, were able to enact
sentencing commissions.254 Commentators often cite those states as
246. See, e.g., Governor Brown’s Prison Plan Jeopardizes Safety of Streets, supra note 230.
247. Governor Brown Signs Legislation to Improve Public Safety and Empower Local Law
Enforcement, CA.GOV. (Apr. 5, 2011), http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=16964.
248. Unjust and Ineffective: America has Pioneered the Harsh Punishment of Sex Offenders. Does it
Work?, ECONOMIST, Aug. 8, 2009, at 21, available at http://www.economist.com/node/14164614.
249. CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., 2011 PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT FACT SHEET (July 15,
2011), http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/About_CDCR/docs/Realignment-Fact-Sheet.pdf.
250. See Assem. 109, 2011–2012 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011); Assem. 117, 2011–2012 Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2011).
251. See discussion supra Part II.
252. See discussion infra Part VI.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 122–75.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 214–15.
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models for how to allocate rationally limited prison resources while
protecting the public.255 So why has broad reform been so elusive in
California?
Around the country, early release for older prisoners—typically
based on evidence-based criteria—is not controversial. States
adopting Project for Older Prisoners (POP)256 programs have
experienced significant savings by releasing older felons, who do not
commit additional crimes.257 Mississippi, according to a recent story
on the web, has saved $5 million over seven years by releasing
eighty-nine terminally ill inmates.258
By comparison, California first enacted a compassionate release
statute in the late 1990s259 and then another, replacing the earlier act
in 2010.260 But the state seldom grants parole for this target group
even under the 2010 provision.261 Further, unlike early release
programs elsewhere, in California, an offender granted medical
parole must be returned to prison if his condition improves.262
Early release programs in both states have their critics. For
example, a victims’ rights group in Mississippi has questioned
whether early release shows more compassion to prisoners than the
offenders showed their victims.263 Despite its infrequent use and

255. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 25, 2011) (Reporter’s
Note at 58–64).
256. Vitiello & Kelso, supra note 6, at 948–49.
257. See Testimony Before the H. Subcomm., supra note 17. Savings do not come merely from
shifting the responsibility of care from the states to Medicare or Medicaid. Caring for infirm individuals
is much less expensive outside the prison setting. Jack Dolan, Despite Medical Parole Law,
Hospitalized Prisoners Are Costing Taxpayers Millions, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2011),
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/02/local/la-me-prisons-20110302 (“Authorities have identified 25
‘permanently medically incapacitated’ inmates being treated at outside hospitals who are candidates for
parole because they no longer pose a threat to the public. Californians will pay more than $50 million to
treat them this year, between $19 million and $21 million of that for guards’ salaries, benefits[,] and
overtime, according to data from the federal receiver who oversees California prison healthcare.”).
258. Prison Early Release Program Saving Mississippi Millions, supra note 227.
259. Assem. 29, 1997–1998 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997).
260. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2065 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 8 of 2012 Reg. Sess.).
261. Reforms Needed for Compassionate Release of Prison Inmates, MEDICAL XPRESS (June 2,
2011), http://medicalxpress.com/news/2011-06-reforms-compassionate-prison-inmates.html.
262. Assem. 29, 1997–1998 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997).
263. Gates, supra note 144.
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significant restrictions, California’s program has similar critics
among victims’ rights advocates.264
Despite criticisms from victims’ rights groups, reforms have taken
place in states like Mississippi, seemingly with a consensus among
diverse political groups.265 The comparison to California is striking:
California, a far more progressive state on a broad range of issues,
has greater difficulty in achieving reform.
As with medical parole, similar groups have already targeted
realignment despite the fact that, at least if my analysis is correct,
realignment is a modest reform effort.266 Notable are efforts by
California’s Assembly Republicans, who have created a video
attacking Governor Brown for risking public safety by backing
realignment.267 The ad includes “scary-looking thugs and ominous
music.”268 The Assembly Republicans have also created a website,
California Crime Watch, where they will post information about
increased criminal activity.269 Similarly, the Los Angeles County
District Attorney has joined the criticism of realignment and has
argued that the new law “casts too wide a net in defining ‘low level
offenses.’”270
Comparing California’s difficulty in achieving modest sentencing
reform with broader efforts around the county invites a legitimate
question: why does California have such a difficult time in achieving
reform? A number of factors have coalesced over the past thirty
years: anyone interested in identifying why California cannot reform
its system should examine the role of the prison guards’ union,271

264. Kathy McManus, Redefining Compassionate Release, RESP. PROJECT (Sept. 29, 2009),
http://responsibility-project.libertymutual.com/blog/redefining-compassionaterelease#fbid=sDYoxQ5EoDx.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 122–75.
266. See supra text accompanying notes 227–51.
267. Nannette Miranda, Assembly Republicans Release Ad on Brown’s Prison Shift, ABC7 NEWS
(Oct. 17, 2011), http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=news/politics&id=8395637.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Don Thompson, California Prison Realignment Plan Broadly Defines Crimes, HUFFINGTON
POST (Oct. 4, 2011, 7:43 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/04/california-prisonrealignment_n_995075.html.
271. See infra text accompanying notes 276–88.
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victim rights groups,272 myths surrounding the effect of Three
Strikes,273 and term limits.274 Further, one cannot discuss the role of
CCPOA and victims’ rights groups separately because of the union’s
role in creating and supporting some of those groups.275
Created in 1957 as a social club, the California Correctional
Officers Association (CCOA) became a powerful political
association during the 1980s.276 Under the tutelage of union President
Don Novey beginning in 1980, the CCOA became the California
Correctional Peace Officers Association.277 Novey took over at an
ideal time for the growth of the union.278 Beginning with the 1968
presidential election, conservatives made law-and-order a winning
political strategy.279 The 1980s also saw the expansion of the war on
drugs.280 After abandoning indeterminate sentencing in 1976, the
legislature went on a binge from 1984 to 1991, during which it
passed more than a thousand bills changing criminal laws, usually
increasing prison sentences or changing misdemeanors to felonies.281
With the increased prison population came a 600% increase in
CCPOA’s membership from 1982 to 2001.282
Not only were dues pouring in, but Novey understood the power of
money in the political process. Since 1982, CCPOA has created at
least eight PACs and “employed its political resources to reward
friends, punish enemies, and construct the ‘specter of the CCPOA’—
an image of an omnipotent, unpredictable, and merciless labor
organization.”283 The association has spread its largesse across the
political aisle. For example, Governor Pete Wilson received $1
million in donations from the CCPOA after he announced his support
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

See infra text accompanying notes 289–98.
See infra text accompanying notes 313–21.
See infra text accompanying notes 322–29.
See infra text accompanying notes 289–95.
PAGE, supra note 64, at 15, 41.
Id. at 41–43.
Id. at 45–50.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 9, 47.
Id. at 47.
PAGE, supra note 64, at 48.
Id. at 44, 52.
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for the three strikes law.284 Both recent Democratic Governors Davis
and Brown have also received significant support from the union.285
In 2010, CCPOA spent $7 million supporting 107 candidates; 104 of
them were elected.286
One measure of the union’s success is the pay scale for its
members. Requiring only a high school education, officers make
substantial incomes: one in ten officers make more than $100,000 a
year.287 One effective political campaign resulted in a union contract
spanning 2001 to 2006 in which the state agreed to match pay for
CCPOA members with California Highway Patrol officers.288
The CCPOA’s focus is not limited to member benefits. As part of
its strategy to extend its power, the union has created victims’ rights
groups.289 The CCPOA created both Crime Victims United of
California (a political action committee) and the Doris Tate Crime
Victims Bureau. Both groups have influenced public debate and
political discussion of prison reform in California. These groups act
as the unions’ alter egos. Crime Victims United of California is the
vehicle through which the CCPOA donates to political issues.290 For
many years the CCPOA has been Crime Victims United of
California’s only donor.291 Although the union claims there is no
ulterior motive to their involvement in victims’ rights, union

284. Laura Sullivan, Folsom Embodies California’s Prison Blues, NPR (Aug. 13, 2009),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=111843426.
285. California Correctional Peace Officers Association, UC Berkeley INST. GOVERNMENTAL STUD.
(Jan
31,
2008),
http://igs.berkeley.edu/library/research/quickhelp/policy/social/ca_prison_unionOLD.html;
John Seiler, Court Decision Could Spur Prison Reform, CAL. WATCHDOG (May 23, 2011),
http://www.calwatchdog.com/2011/05/23/court-decision-could-spur-prison-reform/.
286. John Seiler, Court Decision Could Spur Prison Reform, CAL.WATCHDOG (May 23, 2011),
http://www.calwatchdog.com/2011/05/23/court-decision-could-spur-prison-reform/.
287. Sullivan, supra note 284. Even apart from the increased criminal sentences, that figure alone
explains why California spends so much more on its prison system than other states. For example,
guards in states like Texas make half as much as those in California. David Mildenberg & James Nash,
California, Texas, and State Workers’ Pay, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 28, 2011, 5:00 PM),
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/11_19/b4227025728517.htm.
288. PAGE, supra note 64, at 76–77.
289. Id. at 82.
290. Sullivan, supra note 284.
291. Id.
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spokesman Lance Corcoran could not deny that the union benefited
from the passage of laws mandating longer prison sentences.292
Whether the group was created by the CCPOA or merely
supported by the CCPOA, victims’ rights groups have crusaded
against prison reform mechanisms such as early release and
compassionate release of prisoners. Crime Victims United of
California sued the state over the state’s day-for-day early release
program.293 “The suit contends that the state Constitution prohibits
the early release of prisoners because of crowding, that crime victims
have a right to weigh in before an inmate is released and that the state
is legally bound to provide adequate prisons.”294 Further, rumors of
the union’s loss of political clout have proven overstated in light of
its recent contract with Governor Brown. At least for now, the
CCPOA is a force not easily opposed.295
A discussion of the CCPOA’s relationship with victims’ rights
organizations and victims’ rights advocates is not complete without
mentioning Mike Reynolds. Reynolds became an activist after a
repeat felon murdered his daughter.296 His efforts led to the passage
of the “Three Strikes and You’re Out” law and the 10-20-Life law,
both of which add years of incarceration to criminals sentenced under
these provisions.297 He also opposes the early release and
compassionate release of prisoners and warns of the dangers
associated with releasing violent criminals in order to save money.298
292. Duane Lester, How Prison Unions Helped Create Overcrowding Problem In California, ALL
AM. BLOGGER (May 24, 2011),
http://www.allamericanblogger.com/15848/how-prison-unions-helped-create-overcrowding-problem-incalifornia/.
293. Marisa Lagos, Advocacy Group Sues Over Early-Release Law, S.F. CHRON. (Feb 18, 2010, 4:00
AM),
http://articles.sfgate.com/2010-02-18/bay-area/17926727_1_early-release-early-release-crimevictims-united.
294. Id.
295. See Jon Ortiz, Crown Administration Issues Statement on CCPOA Contract, SACRAMENTO BEE
STATE
WORKER
BLOG
(Mar.
15,
2011,
6:22
PM),
http://blogs.sacbee.com/the_state_worker/2011/03/brown-administration-issues-st.html.
296. Michael Doyle, Jurists Take Up ‘Three Strikes,’ THREE STRIKES & YOU’RE OUT,
http://www.threestrikes.org/fresbee_7.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2012).
297. Mike
Reynolds
Biography,
THREE
STRIKES
&
YOU’RE
OUT,
http://www.threestrikes.org/mreynolds_bio.html (last updated Apr. 4, 2006).
298. Three
Strikes
Information,
THREE
STRIKES
&
YOU’RE
OUT,
http://www.threestrikes.org/articles.html (last updated Dec. 7, 2011).
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Although the CCPOA publicly announced in the early 1990s that it
would no longer support longer sentencing laws, the CCPOA has
made numerous exceptions to that rule, most notably the Three
Strikes Law.299 In 1994, the CCPOA contributed $100,000 to
Reynolds’s campaign in support of the Three Strikes Law.300 Novey
stated, “Mike Reynolds sought the assistance of CCPOA and we
jumped on board—we were determined to help him rid our
neighborhoods of violent felons. Three Strikes and You’re Out
became our initiative.”301 Reports obtained from the Secretary of
State’s office show that the CCPOA has vigorously opposed any
attempt to reform the Three Strikes Law.302 Specifically, between
1995 and 2003, the CCPOA lobbied against all seven reform bills.303
Crime-victims groups opposed six of the seven reform bills.304
Notably, Assembly Bill 109 excluded Three Strikes from its
provisions.305 Even when the public seemed to support modest
reforms to Three Strikes,306 then-Governor Schwarzenegger and the
CCPOA led a last minute effort to defeat Proposition 66.307 In 2004,
Proposition 66 would have required all strikes to be “violent” or
“serious” and would have reduced the number of felonies that
qualified as strikes.308 The CCPOA provided close to $750,000 to
299. PAGE, supra note 64, at 112. Other exceptions to the CCPOA’s no-support-for-longer-sentences
rule abound. The union sponsored the truth-in-sentencing bill in 1994, which increased the minimum
amount of sentence a prisoner would have to serve from 50% of their sentence to 85%. Id. at 113. The
union also sponsored a “one strike for violent sex offenders” bill in 1994, which required a mandatory
twenty-five-to-life sentence for sex crimes involving force or kidnapping. Id. at 113. The CCPOA also
sponsored a bill which increased the age a minor could be tried as an adult from sixteen to fourteen, and
sponsored a separate bill which sent juveniles sixteen and older to adult prison for certain violent or
serious crimes, rather than to the California Youth Authority. Id. at 113–14.
300. Id. at 119.
301. Id. at 121.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB, supra note 249.
306. MARK DICAMILLO & MERVIN FIELD, FIELD RES. CORP., THE FIELD POLL: LARGE MAJORITY
CONTINUES TO FAVOR PROP. 66, TO LIMIT “THREE STRIKES” LAW (2004), available at
http://www.field.com/fieldpollonline/subscribers/RLS2141.pdf.
307. Mark Martin, Proposition 66: Efforts to Reform ‘Three Strikes’ Law Likely to be on Ballot
Again, S.F. CHRON. (Nov. 4, 2004), http://articles.sfgate.com/2004-11-04/bay-area/17451993_1_threestrikes-strikes-law-sentences.
308. PAGE, supra note 64, at 123.
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fund the campaign against Proposition 66.309 The CCPOA created an
organization to defeat Proposition 66 called Californians United for
Public Safety (CUPS), comprised of law enforcement and victims’
rights groups.310 CUPS launched the “Felon a Day” campaign against
Proposition 66, which released a mug shot and rap sheet of a felon
every day who could have been released early by Proposition 66.311
CUPS also sent out press releases, produced three television
commercials, and created three radio spots to oppose Proposition
66.312
More recently, when moderate-conservative District Attorney
Steve Cooley backed another even more modest ballot initiative to
limit Three Strikes,313 leaders of the California District Attorneys
Association caused him to withdraw from its board.314 Simply put,
the Three Strikes Law has powerful allies and real staying power. But
does the law deserve such strong adherence?
The best explanation for Three Strikes’s staying power can be
found in Punishment and Democracy: Three Strikes and You’re Out
in California.315 There, Frank Zimring and his co-authors describe
the powerful mythology built up around the law: until passage of
Three Strikes, crime rates were on a steady incline; as soon as the law
passed, crime rates showed a sharp decline that remained constant
over time.316 But as the authors demonstrated, to make that claim,
supporters of Three Strikes had to aggregate crime data for the three
years prior to the passage of the law.317 A year-by-year analysis
showed the decline beginning before passage of Three Strikes.318
309. Id. at 127.
310. Id. at 124.
311. Id. at 126.
312. Id. at 126–27.
313. Joe Domanick, New Count for Three-Strikes Law, L.A. WKLY NEWS (Jan. 13, 2006),
http://www.laweekly.com/2006-01-12/news/new-count-for-three-strikes-law/2/.
314. Kenneth Ofgang, Personality Profile: Steve Cooley. County’s Second-Longest Serving D.A.
Takes Pride in Record, Looks to Future, METROPOLITAN NEWS-ENTERPRISE (Jan. 14, 2010),
http://www.metnews.com/articles/2010/cooley011410.htm.
315. ZIMRING, supra note 206.
316. Mike Males & Dan Macallair, Striking Out: The Failure of California’s “Three Strikes and
You’re Out” Law, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 65, 65–68 (1999).
317. ZIMRING, supra note 206, at 91–100.
318. Id.
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Further, the authors’ empirical study demonstrated very limited
benefits, if any at all, that result from a possible deterrent effect of
the law.319 More importantly, other states have experienced even
sharper drops in crime without the benefit of such expansive statutes
as Three Strikes.320
In reviewing Punishment and Democracy, I wrote,
Economic arguments may influence voters and politicians.
Polls suggest that voters are less enthusiastic about Three
Strikes when they realize that it may require hard choices
between further prison construction and education
spending. The recent downturn in the state and national
economies soon may make competition for scarce
resources a reality again. California’s energy crisis
demonstrates how quickly a budgetary surplus can
disappear.321
Subsequent developments, including the exemption of Three
Strikes from Assembly Bill 109, prove that I was not a very good
prognosticator.
The influence of the CCPOA and victims’ rights groups is hardly a
secret. Less obvious is the role of term limits put in place in 1990.322
California recently enacted an initiative aimed at creating more
competitive legislative districts.323 To date, however, most voting
districts have been crafted to create safe seats for either party.324 As a
result, members of the assembly, for example, have tended to

319. Id. at 104–05.
320. Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Did “Three Strikes” Cause the Recent Drop in California
Crime? An Analysis of the California Attorney General’s Report, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 101, 128–29
(1998); Franklin Zimring: “The Decline in Crime in New York City,” supra note 175.
321. Michael Vitiello, Punishment and Democracy: A Hard Look at Three Strikes’ Overblown
Promises, 90 CAL. L. REV. 257, 287 (2002).
322. CAL. CONST. Amend. Initiative, Proposition 140 (approved Nov. 6, 1990).
323. Peter Schrag, Op-Ed., California Redistricting: Don’t Expect Any Magic, L.A. TIMES (June 14,
2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/14/opinion/la-oe-schrag-redistricting-20110614.
324. Editorial, The Politics of Redistricting in California, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2011),
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/24/opinion/la-ed-redistricting-20111224.
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represent the extreme wings of their respective parties.325 One might
have thought Democrats interested in sentencing reform could enact
legislation, for example, creating a sentencing commission, without
fear of reprisals. That has not been the case.
Elsewhere, I have speculated that the adoption of term limits goes
a long way towards explaining the unwillingness of many liberal
politicians from tackling reform. Consider a member of the assembly
from one of the bluest districts in the state where constituents may
favor reform.326 Why would that member of the assembly hesitate to
propose or at least back reform? Term limits force that politician to
think about the next political step in his or her career. That step often
means making a run for the state senate and eventually statewide
office.327 And while the assembly district may be deep blue, senate
districts include a much larger and usually more conservative mix of
voters.328 It may also include communities where state prisons are
located, with the resulting economic dependence that those
communities have on the status quo.329
A second aspect of California politics helps to explain the lack of
broader reform. Until a recent initiative created a non-partisan
citizens’ board to oversee redistricting,330 California legislators
effectively redrew their own districts.331 The resulting districts were

325. See Jarrett Stepman, Column: Working Part Time, CAL. AGGIE (Jan. 19, 2010),
http://www.theaggie.org/2010/01/19/column-working-part-time/.
326. I live in Davis, California, considered one of the most liberal communities in the state. For
example, it is sometimes called the “People’s Republic of Davis.” MIKE FITCH, INTRODUCTION TO
GROWING
PAINS:
THIRTY
YEARS
IN
THE
HISTORY
OF
DAVIS
(1998),
http://cityofdavis.org/cdd/cultural/30years/intro.cfm.
327. William P. Meyers, California: Term Limits Not Enough, CAL. DEMOCRACY (Sept. 25, 2011),
http://www.californiademocracy.org/cal/2011/09_25_2011.html.
328. See Juliet Williams, Election Reforms, Tax Initiatives Will Shape 2012, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS (Dec. 31, 2011, 11:13 AM), http://www.mercurynews.com/breaking-news/ci_19652680 (noting
that main purpose of California’s independent redistricting commission was to “promote more centrist
candidates to state legislative seats”). The hope was the creation of the commission would force
candidates to appeal to a broader swath of voters rather than the extremes of either political party. Id.
329. Rina Palta, Could California Close a Women’s Prison?, CROSSCURRENTS FROM KALW NEWS
(Aug.
17,
2011),
http://kalwnews.org/audio/2011/08/17/could-california-close-women’sprison_1175981.html.
330. CAL. CONST. Amend. Initiative, Proposition 11 (approved Nov. 4, 2008).
331. Cal.
Citizens
Redistricting
Comm’n,
FAQ,
WEDRAWTHELINES.CA.GOV,
http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/faq.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2011).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol28/iss4/10

38

Vitiello: Alternatives to Incarceration: Why Is California Lagging Behind?

2012]

ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION

1311

drawn to include large majorities of the incumbents’ own party.332
Too often, legislators’ primary fear was a challenge from a more
extreme member of their own party.333 As budget battles in
California have demonstrated so often, Republicans have held ranks
almost without exception.334 The lack of a single Republican vote for
Assembly Bill 109 demonstrates the extent of party discipline.
Further, in light of arguments by conservatives in favor of sentencing
reform outside the political arena335 and the participation of
conservative Republicans in other conservative states like Mississippi
and Texas,336 Republican members of California’s legislature appear
particularly irresponsible.
I find the view from California truly perplexing. As indicated
above, outside the political arena, a consensus has emerged across a
broad political spectrum including some extreme conservatives that
sentencing reform is imperative and that it can be done without
risking public safety.337 Further, states more conservative than
California have accomplished broader reform than has California.338
In California, assembly Republicans are ready to pounce on
Governor Brown’s modest reform.339 Democrats seem content with
steps far short of the reform that the state needs.340

332. Id.
333. See Reid Wilson, California’s Golden Opportunity at Bipartisanship, NAT’L J. (Aug. 4, 2011,
6:19 AM), http://mobile.nationaljournal.com/columns/on-the-trail/california-s-golden-opportunity-atbipartisanship-20110804.
334. See Phil Matier, Gov. Brown’s Camp Resorts to Name-Calling in Budget Battle, CBS S.F. (June
27, 2011, 3:51 PM), http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2011/06/27/phil-matier-gov-browns-camp-resortsto-name-calling-in-budget-battle/.
335. See supra text accompanying notes 109–22.
336. See Lagos, supra note 222.
337. See supra text accompanying notes 34–122.
338. See supra text accompanying notes 123–76.
339. Nannette Miranda, Jerry Brown’s Prison Realignment Plan Comes Under Fire, ABC30 HD
(Oct. 18, 2011), http://abclocal.go.com/kfsn/story?section=news/politics&id=8395689.
340. See supra text accompanying notes 253–340.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Elsewhere, I have speculated how reform might come to
California.341 Perhaps naively optimistic, I thought that an economic
crisis might force the state to engage in meaningful reform.342
Further, the three-judge panel seemed to offer the added incentive for
broad reform.343 One must hope that California’s economic crisis
does not get worse. Unless it does, the state may have missed its best
chance for meaningful reform of the state’s sentencing scheme and
bloated prison budget.

341. Vitiello & Kelso, supra note 6, at 903.
342. Id. at 952.
343. See supra text accompanying notes 187–210.
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